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NOTHING INEVITABLE ABOUT 
DISCRIMINATORY HIRING: 
LEWIS V. CITY OF CHICAGO AND A RETURN 
TO THE TEXT OF TITLE VII 
James Steinmann* 
Hot on the heels of the landmark case Ricci v. DeStefano,1 the 
U.S. Supreme Court heard Lewis v. City of Chicago,2 another case 
dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).3 
The controversy again revolved around the hiring practices of a 
municipal fire department and its administration of an allegedly 
discriminatory test.4 Whereas the petitioners in Ricci successfully 
argued that the abandonment of an objective employment test with 
racially disparate results violated Title VII,5 the petitioners in Lewis 
alleged the City of Chicago’s use of such a test violated Title VII.6 
Perhaps surprisingly, especially to those regarding the Supreme 
Court as conservative in its Title VII decisions, the Lewis Court not 
only granted petitioners’ writ of certiorari but also unanimously held 
in their favor. 
The ruling in Lewis addressed a relatively narrow issue: whether 
the implementation and each subsequent use of a discriminatory 
hiring practice constitute actionable practices on which to base a 
 
 * J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; M.A., University of California, Los 
Angeles; B.A., Boston College. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review, especially Jeffrey Payne and Elena DeCoste Grieco, for their diligent 
efforts and invaluable help. My thanks also to Professor Michael Waterstone, Associate Dean for 
Research and Academic Centers and J. Howard Ziemann Fellow and Professor of Law, for his 
insight and encouragement. And of course, a special thank you to my wife Lauren and our family 
for their limitless love, patience, and support. 
 1. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 4. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2195. 
 5. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2661. 
 6. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2196. 
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disparate-impact complaint.7 But more broadly, by granting certiorari 
and finding for petitioners on that issue, the Court tempered its 
negative attitude toward Title VII discrimination claims. 
This Comment explains the Supreme Court’s ruling and its 
ramifications, and offers insight into a controversy in which the 
Court, through an opinion by Justice Scalia, unanimously overruled 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit opinion written by 
Judge Posner. Part I explains the factual and legal background of the 
case. Part II outlines the Supreme Court’s reversal, and Part III 
discusses the policy and rationale behind it. Finally, Part IV 
addresses the future implications of the decision and provides some 
possible reasons for this strong reversal of the Seventh Circuit. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The plaintiffs in Lewis brought suit in the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the City of Chicago (the 
“City”) had administered a test to firefighter applicants that created a 
disparate impact along racial lines in violation of Title VII.8 The trial 
court found for the plaintiffs on the merits, but the Seventh Circuit 
overturned the decision on procedural grounds.9 
A.  The Facts 
In July 1995, the City administered an exam to approximately 
26,000 firefighter applicants.10 Starting in May 1996, the City relied 
on the results of this exam in selecting candidates to continue the 
hiring and training process.11 The City labeled applicants who scored 
at least 89 points “well qualified” and randomly drew candidates 
from this pool from 1996 to 2001.12 Those candidates could then 
proceed to the next hiring phases—physical tests, background 
screening, and so on.13 
The City categorized as “qualified” those applicants scoring 
 
 7. Id. at 2193–94. 
 8. Lewis v. City of Chi., No. 98 C 5596, 2005 WL 693618 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2005), rev’d, 
528 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010). 
 9. 528 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010). 
 10. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2195. 
 11. Id. at 2196. 
 12. Id. at 2195–96; Lewis, 2005 WL 693618, at *2. 
 13. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2195. 
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between 65 and 88, and informed them in good faith that their 
applications would be kept on file but that their chances of being 
hired were low because of the large number of applications.14 By 
2001, however, the City had exhausted the supply of well-qualified 
applicants and started drawing from the qualified pool.15 Despite 
scoring in the 65- to 88-point range, the applicants from the Chicago 
Fire Academy’s class of 2003 were no less qualified than the earlier 
classes with test scores of 89 or above.16 
B.  The Complaint 
In March 1997, Crawford Smith and five other African 
American applicants who fell into the qualified group—and had 
consequently not been hired—alleged that the 1995 test produced an 
unjustified adverse impact on African American applicants in 
violation of Title VII.17 Before the plaintiffs could sue in federal 
court, however, the Act required them to file a complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and obtain 
right-to-sue letters.18 In this case, the statute of limitations period for 
such a filing was 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment 
practice occurred.”19 Thus, determining whether the plaintiffs’ 
complaint was timely required “identify[ing] precisely the ‘unlawful 
employment practice’” that caused their injury.20 
In September 1998, the plaintiffs sued in district court.21 The 
City sought summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed 
to file their EEOC complaint within the 300-day limitations period.22 
The court denied the defendant’s motion, holding that the limitations 
period had not begun to run because the City’s refusal to process the 
 
 14. Id. at 2195–96. 
 15. Lewis, 2005 WL 693618, at *2. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at *1. 
 18. See Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2196. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). In certain circumstances the limitations period is 180 
days; but if, as here, the state in which the complaint is filed has an administrative agency with 
the authority to remedy Title VII wrongs, the period is 300 days. Id.; see also Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Lewis, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (No. 08-974) 
(explaining the determination of which limitations period applies). 
 20. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980)). 
 21. Lewis, No. 98C5596, 2000 WL 690313, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2000). 
 22. Id. at *4. 
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plaintiffs’ applications constituted a “continuing violation.”23 Under 
this theory, the defendant’s acts were treated as one “‘systemic’ 
continuing violation”24 stemming from the employer’s “express, 
openly espoused policy that [was] alleged to be discriminatory.”25 
The plaintiffs’ EEOC claim was thus timely, and the case proceeded 
to trial on the merits. 
At trial, it was undisputed that the City’s examination had 
produced a severe adverse impact on African American applicants.26 
Although there was no difference between white and African 
American firefighters in performance, only 2.2 percent of African 
American applicants were deemed well qualified compared to 12.6 
percent of white applicants.27 As the court put it, “In other words, the 
City’s decision to select only those applicants who scored 89 and 
above meant that white applicants were five times more likely than 
African-Americans to advance to the next stage of the hiring 
process.”28 Furthermore, the trial stood against a backdrop of 
commentary in the press describing the Chicago Fire Department’s 
“long history of institutional racism” and allegations that the test was 
intentionally being used as a way to screen minorities.29 Whether 
Chicago’s social environment influenced the court’s decision is 
beyond speculation, but the fuse had been lit on a potential powder 
keg of racial tension in the city. 
The district court found for the plaintiffs.30 Because the disparate 
impact of the test was undisputed, the burden was on the City to 
show that its use of the test was “job related for the position in 
question” and “consistent with business necessity.”31 The crux of this 
analysis was whether the test results adequately correlated to each 
applicant’s prospective abilities as a firefighter—that is, whether 
applicants scoring at least 89 on the test would become better 
firefighters than those scoring 88 or below.32 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (quoting Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 565 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 25. Id. (quoting Selan, 969 F.2d at 565). 
 26. Lewis, 2005 WL 693618, at *2. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Celeste Garrett, Editorial, The Fire Rages On, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 12, 1997, at 35. 
 30. Lewis, 2005 WL 693618, at *1. 
 31. Id. at *8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000)). 
 32. Id. 
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According to its designer’s testimony, the test had a margin of 
error of thirteen points—meaning that the City’s cutoff score of 89 
points was too high to distinguish between qualified and unqualified 
candidates.33 The court expressed serious concerns about whether the 
examination could reliably measure the cognitive skills that it was 
designed to test at all, and the City failed to prove its predictive value 
and validity.34 The City’s “business necessity” defense thus failed.35 
Finally, even if the City had met its burden of demonstrating the 
examination’s business necessity, the plaintiffs would still have 
prevailed on the basis that a less-discriminatory alternative was 
available.36 That is, the City could have used the method it had 
adopted after exhausting the supply of well-qualified applicants: it 
could have selected randomly from the applicants scoring at least 65 
points without any detriment to the quality of the firefighters 
produced, as illustrated by the quality of the Academy’s 2003 class 
of firefighters versus earlier graduating classes.37 
C.  The City Appeals 
Having been defeated on the merits, the City appealed to the 
Seventh Circuit, again arguing that the plaintiffs did not bring their 
complaints to the EEOC in a timely manner.38 The plaintiffs had filed 
with the EEOC on March 21, 1997, around 417 to 419 days after 
they had received notice of their test results.39 The district court judge 
had ruled that the suit was timely because it was brought within 300 
days of the City’ beginning to hire well-qualified applicants.40 But 
the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had erred on this issue. 
On appeal, the plaintiffs again argued that the City’s application 
of its hiring policy constituted a “continuing violation.”41 The 
Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, holding instead that a 
“continuing violation” is one in which a “series of acts by a 
 
 33. See id. at *4–5. 
 34. Id. at *9–12. 
 35. Id. at *9. 
 36. Id. at *14. 
 37. Id.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 38. Lewis v. City of Chi., 528 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 492. 
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prospective defendant blossoms into a wrongful injury on which a 
suit can be based” and is thus more aptly described as “cumulative” 
rather than “continuing.”42 According to the Seventh Circuit, the 
plaintiffs had been injured when they received notice of their 
qualified status in 1995—a discrete moment in time, and beyond the 
limitations period.43 
The Seventh Circuit relied on a string of cases, including 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.44 In Ledbetter, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s finding that the 
plaintiff’s Title VII complaint was untimely.45 Lilly Ledbetter alleged 
that Goodyear had given her poor performance reviews because of 
her gender and that those reviews resulted in, among other things, 
lower pay.46 The Court held that “[b]ecause a pay-setting decision is 
a ‘discrete act,’ it follows that the period for filing an EEOC charge 
begins when the act occurs.”47 That is, the decision to pay Ledbetter 
less was actionable, but the paychecks themselves were merely the 
inevitable consequence of that decision. Thus, her subsequent 
paychecks did not renew the limitations period or provide discrete 
causes of action. The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Ledbetter is 
notable because the Supreme Court’s holding there triggered a 
legislative response: the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 200948 
(“Ledbetter Act”), which superseded Ledbetter by specifically 
allowing actions based on each payment of wages, benefits, or other 
compensation.49 
The Seventh Circuit also cited Delaware State College v. 
Ricks,50 in which a college professor was terminated at the end of a 
 
 42. Id. at 493. 
 43. Id. 
 44. 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 45. Id. at 621. 
 46. Id. at 622. 
 47. Id. at 621. 
 48. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010); see Russell v. County of Nassau, 
696 F. Supp. 2d 213, 226–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining the Ledbetter Act). The Ledbetter Act 
also allows recovery of back pay for up to two years preceding the filing of the charge when the 
basis for the complaint is similar or related to unlawful practices occurring outside the time for 
filing a charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(B). Thus, the Seventh Circuit relied on superseded case 
law, rendering its decision ripe for reversal. 
 50. 449 U.S. 250 (1980). 
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one-year employment contract that he had accepted after being 
denied tenure.51 There, the Supreme Court reversed a Third Circuit 
decision that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the 
teacher’s termination; rather, the 300-day statute of limitations 
commenced when the professor had been denied tenure.52 The 
Seventh Circuit applied the same rationale in Lewis: “The hiring only 
of applicants classified ‘well qualified’ was the automatic 
consequence of the test scores rather than the product of a fresh act 
of discrimination.”53 That is, the court found that the disparate impact 
had been produced by the test scores—which became known when 
the applicants received them—not the City’s continued reliance on 
them.54 
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the statute of 
limitations had started running when the plaintiffs received notice of 
their qualified status in 1995 and that the 300-day limitations period 
therefore barred their complaint.55 Finally, the appellate court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ equitable tolling argument and consequently 
reversed the district court’s ruling with instructions to enter judgment 
for the City.56 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The plaintiffs in Lewis petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari, asking whether a plaintiff must file an “EEOC 
charge within 300 days after the announcement of the practice, or . . . 
within 300 days after the employer’s use of the discriminatory 
practice.”57 Respondent City presented the question as “[w]hether the 
limitations period on a Title VII . . . starts to run only when the list 
[of examination results] is adopted and announced, or also later, 
 
 51. Lewis v. City of Chi., 528 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. 250), 
rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. The Seventh Circuit additionally cited Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 
900 (1989), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), as supporting the notion 
that “present effects of prior actions cannot lead to Title VII liability.” Lewis, 528 F.3d at 491. 
But, as discussed infra Part II, the Supreme Court disagreed. Lewis v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 
2195, 2199 (2010). 
 55. Lewis, 528 F.3d at 491. 
 56. Id. at 493–94. 
 57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lewis, 130 S. Ct. 2195 (No. 08-974) (emphasis 
added). 
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upon each use of the same list.”58 
The Court granted certiorari and unanimously overruled the 
Seventh Circuit in an opinion by Justice Scalia.59 The Court held that 
a plaintiff who does not file a timely complaint challenging the 
adoption of a discriminatory practice may nevertheless assert a 
disparate-impact claim in a timely charge challenging the later use of 
that practice.60 Thus, the Court rejected the respondents’ framing of 
the issue—whether the repeated reliance on a discriminatory 
employment practice constitutes a “continuing violation”—and 
adopted the petitioners’ question: whether the use of a previously 
implemented policy represents a distinct cause on which a plaintiff 
may base a disparate-impact complaint.61 The Court found that it 
does.62 
While Title VII did not originally expressly prohibit disparate-
impact discrimination, the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.63 
nevertheless found that Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions 
“proscib[ed] not only overt discrimination but also practices that are 
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”64 The legislature 
eventually crystallized this concept by passing the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991,65 which added § 2000e-2(k) to the statute.66 This section’s 
language focuses on a defendant’s use of “a particular employment 
practice” causing a disparate impact.67 The Lewis Court pointed out 
that Title VII does not make explicit the meaning of “employment 
 
 58. Brief for Respondent in Opposition at i, Lewis, 130 S. Ct. 2195 (No. 09-974) (emphasis 
added). 
 59. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2195. 
 60. Id. at 2197. 
 61. Id. at 2199. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 64. Id. at 2197 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
 65. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C and 42 U.S.C.). 
 66. Id. § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074–75. 
 67. The added section provides: 
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established 
under this subchapter only if . . . (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent 
uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that 
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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practice,” but that it encompasses the injury in this case: the 
exclusion of applicants based on their test scores.68 Thus, the central 
question was whether the use of the 89-point cutoff score could form 
the basis of a disparate impact claim; the Court said that it could.69 
The City argued that § 2000e-2(k) does not address the accrual 
of disparate-impact claims and that § 2000e-5(e)(1) controls when 
the limitations period runs.70 The Court addressed this, stating: 
That is true but irrelevant. Aside from the first round of 
selection in May 1996 . . . , the acts petitioners challenge—
the City’s use of its cutoff score in selecting candidates—
occurred within the charging period. Accordingly, no one 
disputes that if petitioners could bring new claims based on 
those acts, their claims were timely. The issue, in other 
words, is not when petitioners’ claims accrued, but whether 
they could accrue at all.71 
The Court also rejected the City’s argument that section 2000e-
2(k) dictates only which party bears the burden of proof because 
section 2000e-2(k) states that “a claim ‘is established’ if an employer 
‘uses’ an ‘employment practice’ that ‘causes a disparate impact’ on 
one of the enumerated bases.”72 
The Court then addressed the City’s rationale (which the 
Seventh Circuit had adopted) that the only actionable discrimination 
occurred when the City categorized applicants according to their test 
scores.73 Certainly, the decision to categorize applicants according to 
their cutoff scores represented an actionable injury, and because no 
timely complaint was made, the City was “entitled to treat that past 
act as lawful.”74 
But the Seventh Circuit erroneously held that the “automatic” 
consequences of that wrong could not lead to Title VII liability.75 
According to the Court, the Seventh Circuit had relied on cases 
establishing only that a Title VII plaintiff “must show a ‘present 
 
 68. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2198. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 58, at 17–18. 
 71. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2198. 
 72. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)). 
 73. Id. at 2198–99. 
 74. Id. at 2199 (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977)). 
 75. Id. 
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violation’ within the limitations period.”76 The requirement that 
plaintiffs show a “present violation” depends on the basis of the 
cause of action—whether it is based on disparate impact (as in 
Lewis), or disparate treatment (as in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 
Inc.77 and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans78). The reason the plaintiffs 
in Ledbetter, Lorance, Ricks, and Evans did not prevail based on 
“present effects of past discrimination” was that their claims required 
a showing of discriminatory intent, “which had not even been 
alleged.”79 But because a disparate-impact case does not require such 
a showing, the position of the plaintiffs in Lewis was not directly 
analogous to that of the plaintiffs in the disparate-treatment cases. 
The Court deferred to Congress on the issue of whether it is 
inappropriate that the statute can lead to differing results based on 
different theories of liability for essentially the same wrong.80 
Finally, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to 
resolve on the merits, given that litigation at trial had revolved 
around the plaintiffs’ “continuing violation” theory, which they had 
since abandoned.81 That is, the parties will no longer have to litigate 
over the adoption and use of the hiring practice as a single wrong but 
over whether the use alone of the eligibility categories caused a 
disparate impact.82 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit will have to 
reassess the district court’s award (based on acts occurring prior to 
the EEOC charging period).83 But at least according to the Supreme 
Court, the plaintiffs have a cognizable claim.84 
III.  RULES AND RAMIFICATIONS—THE POLICY ARGUMENTS 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Lewis will affect both 
 
 76. Id.; see cases cited supra note 54. 
 77. 490 U.S. 900 (1989). 
 78. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). 
 79. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2199. In Ledbetter, for example, plaintiff’s complaint for pay 
discrimination was untimely because the paychecks she received within the charging period were 
merely the “continuing effects of the precharging period discrimination [and] did not make out a 
present violation.” Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 625 (2007). When 
discriminatory intent is alleged, the statute of limitations serves to protect evidence related to 
such intent. Id. at 641. 
 80. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2199–200. 
 81. Id. at 2200. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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employers and potential plaintiffs alike. The policy arguments 
against the Court’s decision revolve around employers’ interests and 
the principles behind statutes of limitation.85 In Ledbetter the Court 
recognized that prompt complaints help protect evidence of intent.86 
Here, however, the City argued that “challenges to eligibility lists 
years after adoption and announcement present their own problems. 
They ‘expose employers to a virtually open-ended period of 
liability’; ‘create substantial uncertainty’ about ‘important staffing 
decisions based upon the list’; and call ‘into question an 
organizational structure’ in place for years, upsetting reliance 
interests.”87 At the same time, plaintiffs are arguably better 
positioned to avoid such problems, even with stricter limitations 
periods—“the careful plaintiff pursues claims in a timely fashion . . . 
and [has] ‘little incentive to delay unreasonably in filing EEOC 
charges.’”88 
Then–Solicitor General Elena Kagan—now an associate justice 
of the Supreme Court—refuted the City’s policy argument: 
 A rule that permits a claimant to challenge each use of 
an employment practice with an unlawful disparate impact 
is consistent with the policy objectives underlying Title 
VII’s charge filing provision. . . . And the evidence 
typically used in disparate-impact cases, which focuses on 
statistical impact and validity, is unlikely to fade over 
time . . . . 
 A contrary rule would allow an employer to continue 
using an unlawful selection device indefinitely, so long as 
no applicant filed an EEOC discrimination charge within 
180 or 300 days of the announcement of the results. It 
would also require applicants to file discrimination charges 
even before they know whether and how the employer will 
use the examination results to make hiring decisions.89 
 
 85. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 58, at 19–20. 
 86. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 625–26 (2007). 
 87. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 58, at 20 (quoting Cox v. City of 
Memphis, 230 F.3d 199, 205 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
 88. Supplemental Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 10, Lewis, 130 S. Ct. 2195 (No. 08-
974) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 19, 
at 29). Perhaps this theory—reminiscent of the “cheapest cost-avoider” economic theory in tort 
law—partially drove Judge Posner’s decision for the Seventh Circuit. 
 89. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 19, at 
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Kagan’s argument is consistent with the legislative response to 
Ledbetter. As mentioned in Part II, supra, Congress superseded 
Ledbetter by enacting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which added 
the following to Title VII: 
[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to 
discrimination in compensation in violation of [Title VII], 
when a discriminatory compensation decision or other 
practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to 
a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or 
when an individual is affected by application of a 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, 
including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation 
is paid . . . .90 
Congress found that the Ledbetter decision undermined statutory 
protections against discrimination in compensation “by unduly 
restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can 
challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or 
other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.”91 Given the 
Court’s decision in Lewis, similar legislation will be unnecessary 
with respect to disparate-impact discrimination—unless Congress 
disagrees with the outcome of Lewis, of course. Whether the Court 
considered the Ledbetter Act in Lewis may be speculative, but it is 
not unreasonable to assume that the legislature’s response to 
Ledbetter helped cement the Court’s textualist interpretation of Title 
VII in Lewis, in contrast with the Seventh Circuit’s economically and 
politically conservative approach.92 
The Court thus rejected the City’s policy arguments, siding 
instead with the petitioners and their amici.93 Although the Court 
acknowledged that employers may face new disparate-impact claims 
for practices they have used for years, this problem is more than 
 
10. The Court disagreed with part of this argument, however—some of the evidence, especially 
with regard to a defendant’s “business necessity” defense, probably will fade with time. See 
Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2200. 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(3)(A) (2006). 
 91. Id. § 2000e-5(2)(1). 
 92. Compare Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2198–220 (interpreting Title VII in accord with the 
analogous purpose of the Ledbetter Act), with Lewis v. City of Chi., 528 F.3d 488, 490–94 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (reaching an opposite conclusion without close scrutiny of Title VII’s text), rev’d, 130 
S. Ct. 2191 (2010). 
 93. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2200. 
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offset by countervailing concerns: 
Under the City’s reading, if an employer adopts an unlawful 
practice and no timely charge is brought, it can continue 
using the practice indefinitely, with impunity, despite 
ongoing disparate impact. Equitable tolling or estoppel may 
allow some affected employees or applicants to sue, but 
many others will be left out in the cold. Moreover, the 
City’s reading may induce plaintiffs aware of the danger of 
delay to file charges upon the announcement of a hiring 
practice, before they have any basis for believing it will 
produce a disparate impact.94 
But in describing its role, the Court stated in a typically Scalian 
fashion: 
[I]t is not our task to assess the consequences of each 
approach and adopt the one that produces the least mischief. 
Our charge is to give effect to the law Congress 
enacted. . . . If that effect was unintended, it is a problem 
for Congress, not one that federal courts can fix.95 
In this way, Justice Scalia’s oft-labeled “conservative” textualist 
approach actually led to the less-conservative result by appropriately 
protecting the looser standard on limitation-periods analyses in Title 
VII cases.96 Consequently, employers must be on guard against not 
only discriminatory policies but also their continued practices. 
IV.  THE LAST WORD: LEWIS, LEDBETTER, AND RICCI 
When an employer adopts a hiring policy that produces a 
disparate impact on protected classes of applicants, that employer has 
violated Title VII. Even if no one challenges the initial adoption of 
such a policy within the limitations period, the employer cannot 
continue to use the policy without worrying about committing 
additional violations. The Court’s holding in Lewis v. City of 
Chicago clarifies that an employer cannot categorize a pool of 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 668–69 (1990) 
(citing Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399, 420–33 
(1989)); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 23–36 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (explaining Scalia’s textualist approach to statutory 
interpretation generally). 
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applicants in a discriminatory way, wait for the statute of limitations 
to run out, and then hire from its preferred categories “with 
impunity.”97 That is, an employer cannot simply implement a 
discriminatory policy and “breathe easy” when it has gone 300 days 
unchallenged.98 On the other hand, employees may wait for a 
discriminatory policy to ripen into an injurious practice without fear 
of being time barred from taking action against the employer.99 
After the Court’s holding in Ricci, this result may surprise 
some—in some ways, Lewis might be described as the reverse of 
Ricci. After all, in Ricci, the city of New Haven defended its decision 
to throw out racially disparate test results on Title VII grounds.100 But 
the Court found that New Haven had actually violated the act by 
doing so without a “strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the 
action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact 
statute.”101 The Court’s decision in Ricci thus signaled a trend toward 
a more conservative interpretation of Title VII, and it has been cited 
as illustrating a judicial framework in which racial minorities are no 
longer considered the primary victims of employer discrimination.102 
Perhaps Judge Posner’s decision for the Seventh Circuit reflects 
just such a politically conservative viewpoint, or perhaps his decision 
was based on economic efficiency principles—treating potential 
plaintiffs as the cheapest cost avoiders in Title VII actions. But the 
conservative Justice Scalia, unanimously backed by the rest of the 
bench, came to the opposite result because Lewis and Ricci actually 
presented very different questions. 
The issue in Lewis was ultimately one of strict statutory 
interpretation. The Seventh Circuit had relied more heavily on easily 
distinguishable cases than on the language of Title VII itself.103 But 
Scalia stuck to his textualist ideology in writing the Court’s opinion 
overturning the Seventh Circuit. Additionally, by the time Lewis 
reached the Court, Ledbetter had been superseded by an act of 
 
 97. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2200. 
 98. See id. at 2193. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, 
Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 73, 82–83 (2010). 
 103. See Lewis v. City of Chi., 528 F.3d 488, 490–94 (7th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2191 
(2010). 
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Congress.104 Although the Ledbetter Act does not apply to the facts 
presented in Lewis, it may nevertheless have influenced the Court’s 
holding. 
Thus, the Court’s textualist approach clarified an area of 
disparate-impact doctrine that may have broad, though perhaps 
subtle, effects. Hopefully, the decision will increase certainty in 
future Title VII litigation while reducing the number of claims the 
EEOC has to process: potential plaintiffs in analogous situations may 
wait to fully assess their injuries before filing EEOC complaints, and 
their complaints should therefore be more concrete and precise. After 
all, an opposite holding may have incentivized the filing of unripe 
EEOC claims just to meet stricter statute of limitations standards, 
even without such claims being clearly defined or such injuries 
ascertained. On the other hand, employers will have to be constantly 
mindful of their employment policies and practices—even newly 
revisiting those they have used for years. 
 
 104. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2)–(3) (2006 & Supp. 
2010). 
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